Selected Publications
BOOKS
Felicitous Underspecification: contextually sensitive expressions that lack unique semantic values in context, 2021, Oxford University Press, New York Here
The Nature and Structure of Content, 2007, Oxford University Press, New York Here
New Thinking About Propositions, (co-authored with Scott Soames and Jeff Speaks), 2014, Oxford University Press, New York Here
Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account, 2001, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts Here
PAPERS
‘Quantifier Domain Restriction and the Problem of Incomplete Quantifiers’ forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language, E. Lepore (ed.)
‘The Contents of Maps’ forthcoming in Oxford University Press anthology on philosophy of language, Ernest Lepore (ed.)
‘Luck and Metasemantics’ in Linguistics Luck, Abrol Fairweather, Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Oxford University Press
‘Unstructured Content’ forthcoming in Oxford University Press volume on unstructured content, Egan, van Elswyk, Kindermann (eds.)
‘ “Descriptive readings” of Noun Phrases’, 2022, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 2, E. Lepore, D. Sosa (eds.) Oxford University Press
‘Transparent and Opaque Contextual Sensitivity’, 2021, Protosociology vol 38: Thirty Years of ProtoSociology: Three Decades between Disciplines, Gerhard Preyer (ed.), 87-105
‘Binding, Compositionality and Semantic Values’, (with Michael Glanzberg), 2020, Philosophers’ Imprint
‘Singular Thought, Russellianism and Mental Files’, 2020, in Singular Thought and Mental Files, James Genone, Rachel Goodman and Nick Kroll (eds.), Oxford University Press, New York
‘Speaker Intentions and Objective Metasemantics’, 2020, in The Architecture of Context and Context Sensitivity, Ciecierski, Tadeusz, Grabarczyk, PaweÅ‚ (eds.), Springer Nature, Switzerland, 55-80
‘On Propositions and Fineness of Grain (Again!)’, Synthese, 2019, 196 (4), 1343-1367
‘Propositions and Truth Bearers’, 2018, in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Michael Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford University Press, 307-332
‘W(h)ither Semantics!(?)’, 2018, Noûs, Vol. 52, Issue 4, 772-795
‘Strong contextual felicity and felicitous underspecification’, 2018, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97 (3), 631-657
‘The Metaphysics of Propositions’, 2017, in Oxford Handbooks Online, Oxford University Press
‘Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis’, 2016, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Oxford University Press, New York, 249-261
‘Timothy Williamson on the Contingently Concrete and Non-concrete’, 2016, Analysis, 76 (2), 190-201
‘Acquaintance, Singular Thought and Propositional Constituency’, 2015, Philosophical Studies Volume 172, Issue 2, 543-560
‘The Metasemantics of Contextual Sensitivity’, 2014, in Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, A. Burgess and B. Sherman eds., Oxford University Press, New York, 97-118
‘Speaker intentions in context’, 2014, Noûs 48, no. 2: 219-237
‘Supplementives, The Coordination Account and Conflicting Intentions’, 2013, in Philosophical Perspectives 27 Philosophy of Language, Wiley-Blackwell, 288-311
‘Propositional Unity: What’s the Problem, Who has it and Who Solves it?’, 2013, Philosophical Studies vol 165 issue 1, 71-93
‘On Fineness of Grain’, 2013, Philosophical Studies, vol 163 number 3, 763-781
‘Questions of Unity’, 2009, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CIX, Part 3, 257-277
‘Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies’, 2008, Philosophical Studies, vol. 141, No. 2, 209-242
‘Complex Demonstratives, QI Uses and Direct Reference’, 2008, The Philosophical Review, 117(1), 99-117
‘What in the world are the ways things might have been?’, 2007, Philosophical Studies 133: 443-453 (Book Symposium on Robert Stalnaker’s Ways a World Might Be)
‘Semantics for Monists’, 2006, Mind, vol 116, 1023-1058
‘Singular Terms, Reference, and Methodology in Semantics’, 2006, Philosophical Issues volume 16: Philosophy of Language (supplement to Noûs), Blackwell, Oxford, 141-161
‘Semantics, Pragmatics and the Role of Semantic Content’ (with Jason Stanley), 2005, in Semantics versus Pragmatics, Zoltan Szabo (ed.), Oxford University Press, New York, 111-164
‘Tense, Modality and Semantic Values’, 2003, Philosophical Perspectives volume 17, Philosophy of Language, J. Hawthorne (ed.), 195-245
‘Designating Propositions’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 111, no. 3, July 2002 (actually appeared October 2003), 341-371
‘Remarks on the Syntax and Semantics of Day Designators’, in Philosophical Perspectives vol 15, J. Tomberlin (ed.) 2001, 291-333
​ ‘On the Possibility of Correct Apparently Circular Dispositional Analyses’, Philosophical Studies, 98:2000, 257-278
‘Are Complex ‘That’ Phrases Devices of Direct Reference?’ Noûs 33:2 (1999), 155-182​
‘What is a Philosophical Analysis?’ Philosophical Studies 90:1998, 155-179
‘Structured Propositions and Sentence Structure’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 25:1996, 495-521
‘Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates’, Noûs 29 (4), 1995, 516-535
‘Anaphora and Operators’, Philosophical Perspectives vol. 8: Logic and Language; 1994, (ed.) J. Tomberlin, 221-250
​ ‘Intentional Identity Generalized’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 22: 1993, 61-93 (Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual 1993)​
‘Instantial Terms, Anaphora and Arbitrary Objects’, Philosophical Studies 61 (1991), 239-265
‘Are Indefinite Descriptions Ambiguous?’, Philosophical Studies 53 (1988), 417-440
‘Pronouns, Descriptions and the Semantics of Discourse’, Philosophical Studies 51 (1987), 341-363